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From Habsburg to Hitler to Haider: The 
Peculiarities of Austrian History 
Harry Ritter 
Western Washington University 
In broad overview, the defining feature of Austrian history since 1866 has been 
dramatic and - since 1918 - sometimes wrenching change.* A greater contrast 
between the country's serene, touristic image and the real historical experiences of 
its people can scarcely be imagined. Other regions - Poland, the formerYugoslavia, 
the former Soviet Union - endured, to be sure, greater human extremes and far 
greater total misery in our century. Sadly, the plight of these nations often occurred 
at the hands of Austrian-bred officials and soldiers, from Hitler, Eichmann, 
Globocnik, and Kaltenbrunner on down.' Yet if other countries suffered more, few, 
in such a brieftime-span, were reimagined and reinvented so often, in so many ways 
- politically, geographically, emotionally. Small wonder that "identity" has long 
been a quandary of Austrian life. Even casual observers of Austria's modem past 
could roughly trace its radical peaks and valleys: 
...Habsburg Austria's exclusion from Bismarck's emerging north German 
Reich following defeat in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866; 
...the final collapse of the centuries-old Habsburg dynastic state at the end of 
World War I; 
...creation of a derelict German-Austrian republic from (in Clemenceau's 
phrase) "what was left over" once the empire's non-German successor states 
were formed; 
...the short but savage 1934 civil war and creation of the Dollfuss dictatorship 
at the height of the Great Depression - an entity which lacked, however, solid 
popular support 
...the absorption of dwarf Austria - der Staat. den keiner wollte2 - into 
Hitler's Third Reich in 193 8, with the uneven compliance of a majority (though 
far from all) of its citizens; 
...rapid industrialization of parts of the alpine region in the context of Nazi 
Germany's war economy, abruptly accelerating modernization; 
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...invention of a second Kleindsterreich after crushing defeat in 1945 - a state 
ambivalently regarded by the victors as, on the one hand, the "first victim of 
Hitlerite aggression" and, on the other, a conquered foe requiring a decade of 
alien occupation and reeducation; 
...and creation of a small, neutral republic under the State Treaty of 1955- 
sovereign, yet still lacking (in the minds of many of its residents) a secure sense 
of its legitimacy as a nation. 
Recurrent, destabilizing change, then, has been the signal attribute of Austrian 
Zeitgeschichte, and new shifts are occurring today, a subject to which this article 
will return at its conclusion. But the main purpose of this essay is to highlight some 
peculiar Austrian continuities of the long and medium term, or at least patterns of 
change slow to unfold, chiefly on the level ofvalues, mental habits, political culture, 
and interactions between society and institutional structures. 
The first of these continuities is underscored in the title of Ernst Hanisch's 
impressive new history of Austria between 1890 and 1990, DerLange Schatten des 
Staates: Osterreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert.3 Greeted 
with controversy in Vienna, Hanisch's panorama represents nonetheless a benchmark 
for future efforts to understand moder Austria's stormy experience; anyone 
seeking a reliable guide to the landmarks of contemporary Austrian history and a 
balanced appraisal of its key issues will be well advised to start with this study. 
In the first third of his book, Hanisch identifies deep structures of Austria's 
early moder and modem longue duree - cultural traditions, mentalites, elite and 
popular behavioral patterns, demographic and economic trends - stretching back 
to the conflicting legacies of the Baroque Age and the Josefinian Enlightenment. 
Despite formidable tensions between these two grand traditions (Baroque spirituality, 
love of ceremony, hierarchy, plenitude, and the ornate; Josefinian austerity, 
simplicity, practicality, reductionism, and rationality), they nonetheless interlaced 
to cast the "long shadow" of legalistic culture, bureaucratism, and the cameralist 
state over subsequent Austrian history, right down to the present day.4 Equivocal 
in its implications, the shadow of early-modern etatism rendered Austrians ill- 
prepared for pluralist democracy and autonomous individualism yet ironically, in 
the long run, eased the path to today's "social partnership," social-liberal welfare 
society, and regulatory state. Overall, Hanisch - a self-professed product of 
Austria's Catholic political heritage - gives his story (almost despite himself) a 
liberalizing twist; he emplots it as an arduous, dialectical expansion of individual 
"life chances" (RalfDahrendorfs term) over against the deep-seated authoritarian 
and antiliberal structures of Austrian life - Catholic tradition, anti-Semitism, and 
authoritarian mindsets. At the same time, his voice is modulated by an ironic tone 
relating to these liberalizing and emancipatory processes - one alert to the unheroic 
side of human behavior so abundantly demonstrated by the recent Austrian past, and 
mindful of the losses, complexities, and future uncertainties as well as the gains 
produced by modernization. 
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Within Hanisch's statist framework, one must stress the persistence and slow 
transformation of legalistic values revolving around group status and the protection 
(via alliance with the state) ofgroup entitlements and interests - in short, the values 
of corporatism. Thirty years ago, invoking corporatism as a conceptual guide to 
serious scholarship would have raised arched eyebrows, and even today it excites 
mixed emotions. A modem version of the ancient notion of corporatism was 
notoriously fashionable as a social nostrum in right-wing circles of the early 
twentieth century; after 1922 it acquired a powerful stigma in the minds of western 
progressives - liberals and socialists alike - due to its association with Mussolini's 
Fascism and its emulators. One of these imitators was precisely the 1930s Austrian 
dictatorship of Engelbert Dollfuss and Kurt von Schuschnigg - a political cul-de- 
sac that remains an embarrassment in Austria today, almost as much as the Nazi 
regime itself. In the 1970s, however, the corporatist taboo was refurbished by 
political scientists interested in interactions between interest groups and the 
neoliberal regulatory state, and there is now a swelling literature on its relevance to 
social science.5 (To avoid confusion over terms, it should be noted that this essay 
uses the expression "neoliberal" in the sense of"social liberalism" - as born in the 
era of Friedrich Naumann - as opposed to the doctrine of the unrestrained free 
market, as the word is sometimes employed nowadays). 
Philippe Schmitter, a leader in the renaissance of interest.in corporatism, 
describes contemporary social corporatism as: 
a distinctive way of organizing interests and influencing public policy.... one 
of several possible arrangements through which interest associations can 
intermediate between their members (individuals, families, firms, groups of all 
kinds) and their interlocutors (especially agencies of the state with authority 
and other resources to satisfy their demands).6 
In the schematic parlance of political science, Schmitter contrasts corporatism 
(characterized by such features as "monopolistic units," "hierarchichal coordination," 
and "devolved implementation") with "pluralism" (distinguished by "multiple 
units," "autonomous interaction," and "persuasive conviction").7 
Many authorities would concur that, in Austria, membership in the type of 
legally defined corporate bodies described by Schmitter remains a benchmark of 
identity and social possibility - i.e., an Austrian Sonderbewusstsein.8 This has 
mitigated the definitive triumph of a pronounced individualist and free-market 
ethos such as that associated with a group of late-nineteenth-century Austrian 
economists now known (somewhat paradoxically, considering the small resonance 
their doctrines had in post-1918 Austria itself) as the "Austrian School" of economic 
theory. Among scholarship's unfinished tasks is the rigorous grounding ofthe work 
of these thinkers - Carl Menger, Friedrich von Wieser, and Eugen von Bohm- 
Bawerk - in the context of late- nineteenth-century Austrian life.9 They were 
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drawn to Smithian liberalism precisely because the antithetical assumptions of the 
Baroque and Josefinian Polizeistaat persisted so strongly and often oppressively in 
the Austria of their day. Yet even within the Menger school there were echoes of 
the regulatory Obrigkeitsstaat. Despite their heretical attraction to laissez-faire, 
their thought patterns had substantial cameralist roots.'0 They too labored under the 
"long shadow of the state," and Bohm-Bawerk became one of the state's leading 
minions as Habsburg finance minister on different occasions between 1895 and 
1904. It was only a later generation of"Austrian" theorists, led by Ludwig von 
Mises and Friedrich von Hayek, who developed a full-blown antistatist version of 
Menger's ideas - and they had to do it mainly in Anglo-American exile. In many 
ways the economics of Josef Schumpeter - with its stress on institutions and 
governments as well as markets and heroic entrepreneurs - was a more logical 
extension of the founders' ideas, especially those of Wieser. It would, perhaps, be 
instructive to consider the ideas of the late Wieser, or even the late Menger (if not 
Bohm-Bawerk) in relationship to nascent currents of Austrian social liberalism 
represented by someone like the liberal parliamentarian and (briefly) Minister of 
Trade Josef Maria Baerenreither.12 
Unlike the Austrian Economic School, scholarship is amply acquainted with 
the array of romantic and reactionary corporatism that flourished in Old Austria - 
those of Adam Miiller, Karl Baron von Vogelsang, and other precursors of Hugo 
von Hofmannsthal's neo-Baroque, oxymoronic crusade for konservative Revolu- 
tion after 1918, of the holist sociology of Othmar Spann, and ultimately the 
Fatherland Front of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg. In practical terms, however, just as 
significant as such neoconservative ideas for transforming yet perpetuating the 
corporatist heritage were the chambers of commerce and industry and the weighted 
voting classes (curia, or electoral colleges) that evolved after 1848 as non- 
egalitarian mechanisms for representing special interests in the emerging age of 
mass politics. These institutions were championed not by antimodernists, but 
precisely by the liberals that men like Muller and Vogelsang despised, showing that 
antimoderists held no monopoly on the corporate paradigm, and that - in the 
Austrian context - progressivism and corporatism were perfectly compatible. 
(And after 1945 it would become clear how compatible corporatist paradigms were 
with social democracy - which, pragmatically speaking, began evolving into a 
form of neoliberalism after the 1880s.) In fact (and this is perhaps the main thesis 
of the present essay), one way to broadly imagine moder Austrian history since 
1848 might be in terms of a counterpoint between liberal and nonliberal variations 
on the corporatist heme-counterpoint being understood here in something close 
to its literal musical sense, i.e., "melody not single, but moving attended by one or 
more related but independent melodies."'3 (Again, to avoid confusion, the expression 
liberal corporatism is used here to mean corporatist arrangements within the 
framework of the existing or emerging parliamentary/democratic Rechtsstaat.) 
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In view of its overall lack of success as an organized political movement in 
Austria (reaching its nadir in the 1930s and early 1940s), the suggestion that 
liberalism might help us understand the peculiarities ofAustrian history might seem 
far stranger than the appeal to corporatism. Indeed, a key motif of Hanisch's 
imposing survey - even though its narrative commences in the heyday of cultural 
liberalism, the 1890s- is the persistence in Austria ofa popular Untertanenmentalitdt 
and the weakness of liberalism, parliamentary institutions, and civil society gener- 
ally. Granted, in Austria (as in Bismarck's Germany) liberalism operated under 
significant restraints right from the outset of the parliamentary era in 1867, since its 
delegates had no solid control over the appointment and tenure of cabinets or over 
military budgets. Moreover, upper middle-class Honoratiorenliberalismus suffered 
sobering setbacks after 1879 at the hands of Count Taaffe's "iron ring" coalition of 
Slavs, federalists, and clericals (on the imperial level) and (in Vienna) amidst the 
rise of mass political movements of the irrational "sharper key" (schdrfere Tonart): 
Socialism, Christian Socialism, illiberal nationalism, and anti-Semitism.14 These 
counterliberal factors assumed preeminence after 1945 in the minds of scholars 
understandably intent on uncovering the roots of political extremism and 
totalitarianism in Austria - e.g., Adam Wandruszka's classic, 1954 analysis of 
"Osterreich's politische Struktur," Carl Schorske's studies of fin- de- siecle Vienna, 
and John Boyer's books on Karl Lueger.'s 
Yet despite such stress on the demise of Honoratiorenliberalismus, nineteenth- 
century liberals did create the rudiments of a civil society and legal culture that 
would - though often deeply submerged - endure as a liberal strain in Austrian 
history.16 What is important, in this regard, is not so much liberalism viewed as a 
parliamentary faction, but liberalism understood more broadly as an evolving 
spectrum of values, traditions, organizational models, and legal institutions leading 
toward enhanced freedoms, life chances, opportunities, and human rights. The 
subject of north German liberalism has lately drawn increased attention within the 
context of comparative history, Habermas's idea of the public sphere, and the work 
of David Blackbourn and GeoffEley.'7 Gerald Stourzh, in the 1986 introduction to 
a group of essays on Habsburg-era roots of Austria's present "social partnership," 
devoted serious attention to nineteenth-century liberal currents in the history of 
Austrian labor relations; and since 1996, Austro-German liberalism has its social 
historian, with the appearance of Pieter Judson's prize-winning survey of the years 
1848 to 1914, entitled Exclusive Revolutionaries.'8 Neither the north nor south- 
German liberal traditions may exactly fit the image of British liberalism so 
often used as the benchmark for all liberalisms (even by Central European liberals 
themselves), but Blackbourn and Eley have amply demonstrated the fallacy of 
judging all liberalisms by an idealized English standard - even British liberalism 
itself.19 
As just noted, liberalism suffered crippling political and philosophical setbacks 
in the 1880s, but they were not terminal. The middle-class German left 
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was not moribund, but evolving. In the context of Habsburg Austria's liberal- 
corporatist/neo-JosefinianRechtsstaat- satirized (not without reason) as a legalis- 
tic nightmare by Kafka and Musil - liberals of the fin-de-siecle modified the 
universalist ethos and staid and aloof strategies of their mid-century predecessors, 
moving freisinnig politics toward a less generous national liberalism and 
Interessenpolitik. As LotharH6belt shows in his bookKornblume undKaiseradler,20 
they discovered (as the American congressman Tip O'Neill later said) that "all 
politics is local," and that political success in a democratic age and under Old 
Austria's polyglot conditions demanded the articulation of local interests, concerns, 
and fears.21 This political tropism is often read narrowly and against the historical 
grain, as a slippery slope toward the racialist Germanomania of Georg von 
Sch6nerer, understood as portent of Hitler. Hitler certainly cited Sch6nerer as a 
model, but neither Schonerer nor Hitler himself would now be remembered if not 
for World War I and the strange contingencies created by its aftermath.22 
One-dimensional focus on prewar extremists diverts the spotlight from the 
successes of mainstream national liberals in the hybridized liberal-corporatist 
culture of Austria prior to 1914, and inhibits appreciation of the potential vitality of 
that political culture itself, as well as its relevance for today's Austria. Granted, 
mainstream national liberalism moved in a more ethnocentric, populist direction, 
and its rhetoric was frequently strident, often embracing (depending on the locality) 
anti-Czech, anti-Slovene, or anti-Semitic conceits. The fact that it became less 
generous does not disqualify it as liberalism, however, for ungenerous liberalisms 
abounded at the time - not least in Britain and America. 
It would be foolish to deny that national liberalism's adjustments were devoid 
of disquieting potential,23 or to speculate on the survival chances of Old Austria's 
political culture in the absence of World War I. What is clear is that, with its tactical 
modifications, pre-1914 liberalism remained quite successful in regional and 
municipal politics outside Vienna, domain of the renegade liberal Lueger.24 
Schorske's interpretation (based in turn on Wandruszka) depicted Austrian politics 
as tending only toward so-called "post-liberal" radicalism, but pre-1914 Austria 
included more than Vienna and was laden with other possible outcomes.25 
Thus, a hybridized liberal/bureaucratic framework for civil society - and the 
rudiments of a political culture to flesh it out - were indeed serviceable legacies 
of Old Austria to its successor states. True, as Wolfgang Mantl suggests,26 under 
the world economic and geopolitical circumstances that followed World War I 
those rudiments could not take root, and acute political dysfunction was the 
consequence. There was a dramatic eclipse ofAustrian liberalism and, some feared, 
all other liberalisms worldwide. In that setting, there never could be a mass-based 
liberal Lager; the very word "liberal" was additionally burdened in the Austrian 
context by associations with the 1873 stock market crash and philo-Semitism. What 
happened in Weimar Germany more gradually - the contraction of the liberal 
middle and its absorption into polarized factions - was already largely a fact in 
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Austria in 1919, confirmed by the resounding failure of the still-born Biirgerlich- 
Demokratische Partei in the elections of that year. Even today the term liberal 
remains a political liability, a situation complicated by the persistent Marxist myth 
that liberalism was really a way station for fascism, and the fact that after 1945 the 
words liberal,freiheitlich, and what was left of the old national liberal tradition were 
often used as havens by ex-Nazis.27 There is surely much to the notion that, in the 
bewildering conditions after 1918, the diverse corporatist mindsets of the prewar 
period helped create a disposition to support, underestimate, or otherwise fail to 
comprehend the related but distinctly new phenomenon of fascist corporatism 
based on radically new concepts of the state, the law, and the individual. 28 On the 
whole, however, I would argue that in interwar Austria (as in Germany) the triumph 
ofilliberalism was less the result of decline that set in before 1914 than the product 
of short-term contingencies created by the radicalizing engine of the Great War. 
The war was indeed a massive cleavage; it was this "radical rupture," as one recent 
author correctly affirms, that "more than any kind of perceived continuity between 
pre- and postwar German society...produced National Socialism in Germany - and 
fascism in other countries."29 
Still, revisionist socialism was not swamped by the war, and by the 1920s 
German and Austrian Social Democracy (beneath their often extremist rhetoric) 
had become potential conduits for revisionist liberalism and liberal corporatism, 
should favorable conditions arise. After 1945, amidst new circumstances produced 
by Hitler's defeat and the advent of the Cold War, a hybridized neoliberal 
corporatism strongly indebted to the statist, bureaucratic, and legalistic political 
culture of the late Habsburg past supplanted the antiliberal corporatisms that 
dominated between the wars. To be sure, native liberalism's final victory came only 
after native illiberalisms were crushed by foreign powers, and following a decade 
of alien occupation. But, after all, ten years is not so long a time, and without 
substantial roots in the moder past the new neoliberal system could not have taken 
hold. 
In this setting, the hermetically sealed Catholic, socialist, and nationalist Lager 
that arose in the 1880s - that polarized Austria after 1918 and reduced it to civil 
war in the 1930s - were recast into neocorporate frameworks for parity, patronage, 
mutual consultation, conflict resolution, and resource allocation. What formerly 
divided the country now held it together. The parties to this Sozialpartnerschaft did 
not call themselves liberals, but Socialists and Christian populists, and their leaders 
were certainly not inspired by feelings of kinship with older liberal traditions. Their 
actions were often motivated by the narrowest cynicism and expediency.30 The 
words freiheitlich and liberal, still redolent of musty positivism, dogmatic anti- 
clericalism, and Austro-German progressivism' s more ethnocentric and exclusionary 
"national liberal" turn on the eve of World War I, were left to the dregs of the 
nationalist Lager - fatally discredited by its association with Hitler (though its 
members were eagerly recruited by the Socialist and Christian democratic parties). 
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Or, the term liberal was understood pejoratively in a doctrinaire laissez-faire sense, 
as alien to Austrian life, a one-dimensional interpretation that seemed ironically 
reinforced by the antistatist views of the Austrian exile Hayek-to the extent that 
these ideas were known at all in post-1945 Austria. 
Efforts to weld a non-Socialist and non-Catholic third party option from diverse 
middle class, nonunionized, displaced Volksdeutsche, and ex-Nazi constituencies, 
culminating in creation of the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (FPO) in 1955, 
remained factionalized, programmatically unstable, and easily stigmatized as 
rightist and extremist - not least because the first two FPO leaders were, 
respectively, a former minister in Seyss-Inquart's Anschluss cabinet of 1938 
(Anton Reinthaller), and an ex-member of the Waffen-SS (Friedrich Peter). 
Initially ostracized, the party enjoyed minimal electoral success prior to the late 
1980s (although the Realpolitiker Bruno Kreisky shrewdly employed the small 
party to sustain Socialist cabinets between 1970 and 1983, and the FPO was even 
embraced as a Socialist coalition partner from 1983 to 1986). Beneath the language 
and surface static of histoire evenementielle, however, postwar Austria became a 
capitalist welfare state of the neoliberal type, erected on neocorporate arrangements 
and linked economically to West Germany (which allowed it to prosper). And West 
Germany, in its own peculiar way, exhibited pronounced neocorporatist features 
that stretched back through the Weimar to the Wilhelmine period. As usual, the 
peculiarities of Austrian history evolved in the context of a broader German- 
language framework of historical peculiarities.31 
While citizens ofthe reinvented state were still not sure ifthey were "Austrians," 
"Germans," Viennese," "Tyrolese," or kinfolk of some other Heimat, most ofthem 
relished the social peace, affluence, and material security sustained by the system. 
Still, the new Kleinosterreich was not in every respect ideal.32 In broad terms, 
Philippe Schmitter has described the downside of neocorporatist practices for any 
society: 
Although the finding that corporatist arrangements contribute to "govemability" 
through greater citizen compliance, and fiscal effectiveness seems widely accepted, the 
suspicion persists that they surreptitiously undermine democracy. Organizations 
replace persons as the principal participants; pecialized professionals gain at the 
expense of citizen amateurs; direct functional channels of representation to state 
agencies displace territorially based legislative decision making; monopolies and 
privileged access are recognized at the expense of overlapping and competing 
associations; comprehensive national hierarchies diminish the autonomy of local and 
specialized organizations.33 
Added to these negatives are complications produced by global change: the 
collapse of Soviet Communism and end of the Cold War, population pressures 
created by attendant migrations from the south and east, advancing European 
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integration (including Austrian membership in the EU in 1995), and fiscal strains 
within the neoliberal welfare state, world wide. Since 1989, amidst the altered 
setting produced by such changes, it has become fashionable to speak of a "new 
political landscape" and impending "paradigm shift" of political cultures in the 
second Austrian republic. 
In today's geopolitical setting it is not (to recall Friedrich Hebbel's famous 
nineteenth-century remark) a matter of imperial, great power Austria serving as a 
microcosmic theatre where the wider world conducts its rehearsals.34 It is rather a 
question of a small European country where - after a few decades of cozy 
consensualism in which most people generally knew their place and how to play the 
game - global insecurities intrude and enter their phase of residuals and reruns.35 
The issue for today' s Austria is one of adjustment to rapidly changing circumstances 
by a country which, under the postwar collusion of Socialist and Christian Social 
elites, created (as outlined above) a de facto system of social-liberal corporatism in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Building on tourism and an industrializedbase ofnationalized 
enterprises inherited from the Third Reich and which remained linked to West 
Germany's dynamic economy, Austria entered the ranks of advanced industrial 
economies, but remained (obviously) smaller and relatively less modem than the 
leading world economies (e.g., its greater reliance on heavy industry, greater labor 
intensiveness, etc.) The collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989 and Austria's entry 
into the European Union were merely culminating events in an evolution of 
circumstances which brought to a head an "erosion of traditional [ideological] sub- 
cultures, social fragmentation and particularization, and processes of 
individualization."36 For politics in the 1990s this means fractionalization, identity 
politics, the rise ofnew interest groups and parties, and a new, late twentieth-century 
"sharper key" in rhetoric. It is these historically specific conditions ofthe 1980s and 
1990s that impact present Austrian social structures and voter behavior, and that are 
mainly behind the illiberal protest populism exemplified by J6rg Haider and the 
revamped FPO today - not a vestigial fascism or "unmastered past." Diethelm 
Prowe is correct in maintaining that the new wave of populism in Europe is not a 
reprise of interwar fascism.37 "Classic" fascism (as Ernst Nolte argued) should be 
understood in its interwar setting, and we need new terms and categories to 
designate movements that arise from late twentieth and early twenty-first century 
conditions. This is not to deny the many disturbing aspects of the new populism. 
And it is not to trivialize the issue of an unmastered past. The past is indeed in the 
present, and its unmastered aspects are clearly important for the ways Austria's 
scholars, novelists, and mass media conceptualize the country's history, which in 
turn affect people's present behavior and their visions of the future. It is just that 
the issue of an unconquered past should not be confused with the mainsprings of 
present political dynamics. Like the older extremism, the new populism is a product 
of social alienation, but that malaise is not akin to the victimization psychosis and 
antimodernist nostalgia that fed fascism in the 1920s and 1930s. The roots ofprotest 
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populism today do not lie in the estrangement ofAustrian voters from the conditions 
of modem life - democratization, industrialization, secularization, urbanization 
- but in fear (increasingly among blue collar workers) that the fruits of these very 
modem conditions - secure jobs, affluence, and welfare safety nets - will be lost. 
In a sense, the inventors of post-1945 Austria's black-red consensualism were 
too successful. They fashioned a model welfare state which integrated ordinary 
Austrians into modernity. But problems arise when this ingrown elite cannot 
quarantine its creation from external change, and also succumbs to the corrupting 
seductions of wealth and power based on old-boy networks and bureaucratic bloat 
and inbreeding. Nimble opportunists such as Jorg Haider will, not surprisingly, 
arise to capitalize on resentments over the "politics as usual" corporatism of 
mismanagement, waste, and personal enrichment, and will exploit fears that the 
modernizing achievements of this very corporatist system will be squandered. In 
his frequent reliance on the tactics of negative integration, the "telegenic" Haider 
may indeed recall der sch6ne Karl Lueger of a previousfin-de-siecle; his speech, 
and the unspoken lines between it (like that of Lueger before him), is reckless and 
stretches the boundaries of "civil" discourse-a notoriously sensitive issue in 
German-speaking Europe, precisely because of that region's troubled recent past. 
But the global, European, and local setting in which Haider operates is rather 
different from the world of Lueger. 
From a new turn-of-the-century standpoint, one may hazard some final 
thoughts regarding Austria's position in Europe, the current language of scholarship 
and politics, and the historiographical and political relevance of Austria's liberal 
tradition. The thought of instrumentalizing heritage, or "memory," as a means to 
noble or ignoble ends, of constructing "usable" pasts to promote current agendas, 
must properly haunt those who honor the past's alien integrity - for the good of 
present and future as well as the past itself. Nowhere have orchestrations of history 
been more notoriously abused than in moder Central Europe. 
Yet past and present are existentially inseparable. Liberalism, as this essay has 
argued, has demonstrated vastly more staying power than pundits predicted in the 
troubled aftermath of World War I and the Great Depression, or even in the more 
hopeful wake of World War II. Nowhere, in those days, did liberalism's future look 
more bleak than in Germany and Austria. Today, self-styled "Liberal" parties 
remain relatively weak sisters in the middle European political game (the FDP, the 
FPO). Yet who could deny that, at the end of our short twentieth century, neoliberal 
structures govern the limits of the possible in Central and Western Europe, and free 
market rhetoric controls global political discourse? As Austrians, in this world 
setting and in the course of a new kind ofAnschluss, engage the German- and 
French-led process of European Union, sharing the challenges of inventing that 
emerging polity, they may gradually find it increasingly natural to attend more 
closely to thecomparative study of liberalism in its many guises, to attach greater 
value to Central European liberalism's peculiar native roots, and to allow a critical 
regard for Austria's own liberal traditions larger room in their psychological space. 
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In a modest way, something of the sort has been going on for some time now 
to the north, in the scholarship and political discourse of the German Federal 
Republic. Despite the still unmastered pall of Berlin's illiberal past, the task of 
unearthing the history of Central European liberalism is, in fact, slightly easier in 
Germany, where the liberal Freie Demokratische Partei - despite its small 
electoral base - played a key national role as a coalition party from 1949 to the late 
1990s. In displaced form a new interest in the liberal heritage is actually manifest 
in Austria, in the guise of heightened interest in middle-class social history, civil 
society, and biirgerliche culture during the late Habsburg period. Excavation of 
liberalism's legacy in Austria can only happen slowly, for in the historical context 
of the region's political semantics the word and idea of liberalism must be 
disentangled from its peculiar liaison with the tactical rhetoric of late nineteenth- 
century national progressivism and emerging deutschnational populism,38 an idiom 
ironically reinforced by political speech under post-1945 contingencies. 
In this connection, perhaps the most interesting Haider in Austria today is not 
so much J6rg but the historian Barbara Haider. She is the author of the Austrian 
Academy of Sciences' new edition of the protocols of Habsburg Reichsrat's 
committee of constitutional inquiry during late 1867,39 when nineteenth-century 
Austro-German liberalism completed one of its chief tasks: the transformation of 
the monarchy's western half into a parliamentary Rechtsstaat. The catalog of civil 
rights produced by this committee later became the backbone of Austria's first 
republican constitution in 1920, and underpins the Second Republic's constitution 
of today. In light of the relatively slight explicit attention that even recent Austrian 
historians have given to liberalism as a strain in Austria's modem past, it is 
noteworthy that Barbara Haider deliberately presents her work as a "small piece of 
the puzzle known as the 'history ofliberalism'" in Central Europe.40Her introduction 
to the protocols is a judicious appreciation of the fact that midnineteenth century 
Austrian liberalism, despite its manifold shortcomings from present perspectives, 
created the foundations of a civil society and political culture that would - though 
often deeply submerged - endure and become part of a liberal strain of deep 
structural continuity in moder Austrian history. 
Two or three decades ago, a book such as this might have been presented as 
something more abstract and less immediately relevant to present concerns - a 
contribution to Old Austria's Staats- undReichsproblem, the history ofthe empire's 
presumed terminal dysfunctionality, the nationality problem, or the political dregs 
ofthe 1867Ausgleich. Haider's gloss ofthe documents is amodel ofhistoriographical 
tact, one that situates the protocols firmly in the psychic space and social circumstances 
of their own time. Yet despite her healthy respect for old-fashioned Verstehen, the 
fact that she conceptualizes her book not only as a contribution to Austria's 
"constitutional and parliamentary history," but to the history of liberalism as well, 
seems-under present circumstances-not merely historiographically significant 
but politically aktuell. 
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Looking backward- and without minimizing the powerful illiberal strands of 
Austrian history (one would be utterly blind to do so) - the story of Austria between 
1848 and 1998 looks less like one of liberalism's defeat than one of liberal 
continuity, with a spectacular illiberal hiatus between the Dollfuss dictatorship of 
the 1930's and annihilation of the Anschluss dystopia in 1945. Or, perhaps, it has 
been a roller coaster with more or less significant liberal upturns: 1848-1849, the 
years from 1867 to 1914, the first republican ordeal of the 1920s, the era since 1945. 
If the "puzzle" of liberalism ever does become a major focus for research in Austrian 
history, perhaps Austrians will be slightly better equipped, in terms of enhanced 
awareness of part of their heritage, to confront twenty-first- century membership in 
a European Union in which liberalism- in one guise or another (as a TimesLiterary 
Supplement headline recently declared) - is "the only ideology still afloat." 4 
Notes 
*This is a revised version of a luncheon address delivered to the German Studies 
Association in Salt Lake City, October 9, 1998. I am indebted to Professor Edward 
Kaplan of Western Washington University for his comments on the paper. An 
earlier version was presented at the Third Symposium on German History at the 
University of British Columbia, May 24, 1997. Some of the essay's language and 
ideas previously appeared in book reviews for the journal Central European History 
and for the on-line discussion group HABSBURG. 
'On the other hand, the extent of Austria's suffering - for whatever eason - must not be 
minimized. According to official figures relating to the Nazi era, 65,459 Jewish Austrians 
were killed; among non-Jewish Austrians, 2,700 were executed, 32,600 perished in Gestapo 
prisons or concentration camps, 24,300 civilians died during the war, and 247,000 soldiers 
were killed in battle or missing in action. This amounts to 5.58 percent of the population. 
Dieter A. Binder, "The Second Republic: Austria Seen as a Continuum," Austrian History 
Yearbook, 26 (1995): 18, n. 3. 
2Helmut Andics, Der Staat, den keiner wollte: Osterreich 1918-1938 (Vienna, 1962). 
3Vienna, 1994. 
4From the standpoint of state-building - aside from their piety, parent/child isfunctions, 
and capacity for patience - there was less opposition and more continuity between Maria 
Theresa, epitome of the Baroque, and her enlightened son Josef than used to be thought. For 
a recent study, see Derek Beales, Joseph II (Cambridge, 1987), volume I. 
5Philippe C. Schmitter, "Corporatism," The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, ed. 
Joel Krieger (New York, 1993), 195-98. 
6Ibid., 195-96. 
7Ibid., 198. Schmitter describes pluralism as the more characteristic mode of organizing 
interests and influence in the "advanced industrial polities" (196) of the mid- and late 
twentieth century. Indeed, he believes that cases of societies marked by a high degree of 
institutionalized corporatism have been "relatively rare" in history (196). At the same time, 
however, he discerns a late- twentieth -century trend in the direction ofcorporatism; for better 
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or worse, he suggests, all advanced democracies are currently veering from the "spontaneous, 
voluntaristic, and autonomous features of pluralism" toward more structured, organized 
interest representation and vicarious (rather than direct) participation on the part of individuals 
- traits typical of neocorporatism. Today, Schmitter believes, "democracy is being 
transformed by modem corporatism.... Organizations are becoming citizens alongside 
individuals. Accountability and responsiveness are increasing, but at the expense of citizen 
participation and access for all groups. Competition is less interorganizational and more 
intraorganizational.... all modem democracies are becoming more 'interested,' organized, 
and vicarious" (198). 
8Austria, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands are frequently cited as the best-case 
examples of neocorporatism in the contemporary world. Referring to a chart designed to 
juxtapose the ideal-typical features of the "pure corporatist" versus "pure pluralist" model of 
representation and control in current societies, Schmitter asserts: "No existing polity exactly 
replicates the arrangement summarized in either column, although Austria comes closest to 
the former and the United States to the latter" (Schmitter, "Corporatism," 196) (emphasis 
added). For a good exploration of the subject, and many references to the relevant literature 
in political science, sociology, and history, see the essays in Giinter Bischof and Anton 
Pelinka, eds., Austro-Corporatism: Past, Present, Future, Contemporary Austrian Studies, 
4 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1996). 
9Some helpful steps in this direction have been made in numerous essays on the history of 
Austrian economic theory by the University of Vienna economist Erich Streissler and in an 
unpublished 1984 University of Chicago doctoral dissertation by Paul Silverman on "Law 
and Economics in Interwar Vienna: Kelsen, Mises, and the Regeneration of Austrian 
Liberalism." 
'?Paul Silverman, "The Cameralistic Roots of Menger's Achievement," History of Political 
Economy,22 (1990), supplement: 69-91. For a good appreciation of the importance of 
Austrian legalism and administrative culture for the Austrian economic theorists, consult 
Silverman's dissertation, "Law and Economics in Interwar Vienna" (see note 9). 
"Mises, a student in Bohm-Bawerk's seminar, was perhaps influenced by the latter's 
Laocoon despair over his inability to promote reform as finance minister amidst the coils of 
bureaucratic hypertrophy. I owe this idea to a suggestion by Erich Streissler. 
'2On Baerenreither, see Everhard Holtmann, "'Sozialpartnerschaft' und 'Sociale Frage': 
Korporatistische Tradition in Osterreich: Der Standige Beirat des Arbeitsstatistischen 
Amtes als Beispiel paritatischer Interessenvertretung in der Spathabsburgerzeit," Der Staat 
27 (1988): 244-49. On Schumpeter, see the recent flurry of studies: Eduard Marz, Joseph 
Schumpeter: Scholar, Teacher and Politician (New Haven, 1991); Richard Swedberg, 
JosephA. Schumpeter: HisLife and Work(Cambridge, 1991); RobertLoring Allen, Opening 
Doors: TheLife and WorkofJoseph Schumpeter, 2 vols. (New Brunswick, N.J., 1991). Erich 
Streissler designates Wieser (albeit somewhat ironically) as the "central figure of the 
Austrian School" in his essay "Arma virumque cano: Friedrich von Wieser, the Bard as 
Economist," inNorbert Leser, ed., Die WienerSchule derNationalokonomie (Vienna, 1986), 
104. As Lothar H6belt notes, "thoroughgoing Manchester Liberals were scattered fairly 
thinly among Austrian Liberals. The dominant centrist group of the Liberals 
almostunequivocally supported the protective tariff; it was only the Progressives - and not 
even all of them - that voted against the Tariff Bill of 1878. But even they did not regard 
it as a major issue. 
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'3Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 5th edition (emphasis added). On the general question of 
the appropriateness or inappropriateness of using the words "liberal" and "corporatist" in 
tandem, note the remarks of Schmitter, "Corporatism," 196: "In the mid-1970s, a group of 
scholars revived the concept [of corporatism] to describe and explain certain puzzling 
features of advanced industrial democracies that could not be understood by the heretofore 
dominant paradigm, pluralism. To differentiate the new variety from discredited previous 
experiences, these scholars usually added a prefix such as 'liberal,' 'societal,' or 'neo-' to the 
corporatist root." 
'4Carl E. Schorske, "Politics in a New Key: An Austrian Triptych," Journal of Modern 
History 39 (Dec. 1967): 343-86. 
'5Adam Wandruszka, "Osterreichs politische Struktur," in Heinrich Benedikt, ed., Geschichte 
der Republik Osterreich (Vienna, 1954); Carl Schorske, Fin-de-Siecle Vienna: Politics and 
Culture (New York, 1980); John W. Boyer, Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: 
Origins of the Christian Social Movement, 1848-1897 (Chicago, 1981); idem, Culture and 
Political Crisis in Vienna (Chicago, 1995). 
'6See also Harry Ritter, "Austro-German Liberalism and the Moder Liberal Tradition," 
German Studies Review 7 (May 1984): 227-48. For a judicious critique of older survey 
histories and balanced appreciation of more recent work on Habsburg Austria's emerging 
civil society and politics of democratic engagement, consult Gary B. Cohen, "Neither 
Absolutism nor Anarchy: New Narratives on Society and Government in Late Imperial 
Austria," Austrian History Yearbook 29, Part I (1998): 37-61. 
'7David Blackbourn and GeoffEley, The Peculiarities ofGerman History. Bourgeois Society 
and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany (New York, 1984). By now the new interest 
extends to the thesis advisors of some of academic history's next generation of practitioners. 
A recent graduate student workshop at Harvard (November 1996), for instance, invited 
apprentice historians from across North America to present their research on the general 
theme of"Liberalism and Civil Society in Moder Britain and Germany." 
'8Gerald Stourzh, "Zur Institutionengeschichte der Arbeitsbeziehungen und der sozialen 
Sicherung-eine Einfiihrung," in Stourz and Margarete Grandner, eds., Historische Wurzeln 
der Sozial Partnerschaft (Munich, 1986), esp. 25-28; Pieter M. Judson, Exclusive 
Revolutionaries: Liberal Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in the Austrian 
Empire, 1848-1914 (Ann Arbor, 1996). Judson's study won the American Historical 
Association's Herbert Baxter Adams Prize for the best book in European history in 1998. 
See, as well, Judson's Wien Brennt! Die Revolution von 1848 und ihr liberalesErbe (Vienna, 
1998). 
'9Though the emphasis in his work has always been on old-style liberalism's demise due to 
its loss of "social relevance," John Boyer himself notes that after 1867 in Austria liberals 
created a hybridized civil society in which extensive protections for individual rights and 
mechanisms for effective political action coexisted and interlaced with broad bureaucratic 
imperatives. It was, in his words, a uniquely "complex system of neocorporate and 
institutional privileges [emphasis added]," a "mixed constitutional-bureaucratic political 
system in which the German Biirgertum and the Imperial bureaucracy both gained considerable 
leverage against the ruling sovereign. The Austrian system combined both municipal and 
regional political autonomy with state centralism to an extent unprecedented in Prussia or the 
rest of central Europe." John W. Boyer, "Freud, Marriage, and Late Viennese Liberalism: 
A Commentary from 1905," The Journal of Modern History 50 (March 1978): 73. See also 
Cohen, "Neither Absolutism nor Anarchy," 44-48. 
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20Lothar H6belt, Kornblume und Kaiseradler: Die deutsch-freiheitlichen Parteien 
Altosterreichs 1882-1918 (Vienna and Munich, 1993). 
21One of the earliest liberals to learn this was Karl Lueger, who defected to the Christian 
Social camp and created a powerful political machine in Vienna using the political strategies 
of what would now be termed "negative integration." On Lueger's early career as a liberal, 
see Karin Brown, Karl Lueger, the Liberal Years: Democracy, Municipal Reform, and the 
Struggle for Power in the Vienna City Council, 1875-1882 (New York, 1987). 
22Of course, World War I did occur, and so in hindsight we have to take these extremists most 
seriously-which most of their contemporaries did not. If one insists on reading things 
against the grain, there were other, "social liberal" fringe groups on the evolving German left 
who ought to be remembered as well as the Sch6nerianer, since something like the reformist 
liberal system they envisioned has, today, been in place in Central Europe for close to half 
a century. Cf. Eva Holleis, Die Sozialpolitische Partei: Sozialliberale Bestrebungen in Wien 
um die Jahrhundertwende (Munich, 1978); Ingrid Belke, Die sozialreformischen Ideen von 
JosefPopper-Lynkeus (1838-1921) in Zusammenhangmitallgemeinen Reformbestrebungen 
des Wiener Biirgertums um die Jahrhundertwende (Tiibingen, 1979); Karl Holl, Giinter 
Trautmann, and Hans Vorlander, SozialerLiberalismus (G6ttingen, 1986); Richard Charmatz, 
Deutsch-Osterreichische Politik: Studien iiber den Liberalismus und iiber die auswdrtige 
Politik Osterreichs (Leipzig, 1907); Harry Ritter, "Progressive Historians and the Historical 
Imagination in Austria: Heinrich Friedjung and Richard Charmatz," Austrian History 
Yearbook 19-20 (1983-1984), Part I, 78-81. 
23See the concise but subtle exposition in Judson's work of historical popularization, Wien 
Brennt!, 144-50. 
24Boyer's former stress on the liberals' "inability to retain local and regional power bases" 
after initial reverses on the imperial level in 1879 ("Freud, Marriage, and Late Viennese 
Liberalism," 74) has been proven wrong by subsequent research. It is now widely agreed that 
our understanding of civic culture and its vitality in late Habsburg Austria has been skewed 
by focusing so much on Vienna which, except for the fact that it was the imperial seat, was 
in many ways only one of many diverse regional cases. 
25H6belt's Kornblume und Kaiseradler argues that, even on the imperial level, liberals were 
more politically successful than was previously thought. Thus, in modified form, liberal 
structures and habits of thought and action remained alive, sustained in part by a corporatism 
compatible with the enlightened bureaucratism of Josefinian rationalism and the more 
democratic mechanisms of the constitutional Rechtsstaat. One of his more novel ideas in this 
regard is that the convoluted system of government by threat of emergency decree employed 
by Austria's prime ministers after 1900 was rather suited to local circumstances, and actually 
worked, if not always well. At least there was not paralysis. 
26WolfgangMantl,"HistorischeundaktuelleAspekteder6sterreichischenVerfassungsentwicklung 
seit 1918," Osterreich in Geschichte undLiteratur 36 (1992) 6: 368. 
270n this subject see Max Riedelsperger, The Lingering Shadow of Nazism: The Austrian 
Independent Party Movement Since 1945 (New York, 1978); idem., "FPO: Liberal or Nazi?" 
in Conquering the Past: Austrian Nazism Yesterday and Today, ed. Francis Parkinson 
(Detroit, 1989): 257-78. 
28Wieser, in his Gesetz der Macht (Vienna, 1926), may be a case in point. 
29Elisabeth Domansky, "Militarization and Reproduction in World War I Germany," in Geoff 
Eley, ed., Society, Culture, and the State in Germany, 1870-1930 (Ann Arbor, 1996), 433- 
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34. On this point vis-a-vis Germany, see also the concluding chapter of David Blackboum's 
The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1780-1918 (New York, 1998). 
30For a concise discussion, see Binder, "The Second Republic," esp. 19-28 and 36-43. 
3On West Germany, see Werner Abelshauser, "The First Post-Liberal Nation: Stages in the 
Development of Moder Corporatism in Germany,"European History Quarterly 14 (1984): 
285-318. The main pillars of Austria's complicated system, put in place in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, were the chambers of labor, agriculture, and commerce (with compulsory 
membership); a tightlycentralized labor force under the Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund; 
the Joint Commission on Wages and Prices (ParitdtatischeKommission-the linchpin of the 
scheme, bringing together state bureaucrats, party, and union leaders, formed in 1957); and 
a governing tradition of grand coalitions between the two main parties (although the OVP 
ruled on its own from 1966 to 1970, and the Socialists governed either alone or with the small 
third party, the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs [FPO] from 1970 to 1986). For a brief 
overview see Andrei S. Markovits, "Austrian Corporatism in Comparative Perspective," in 
Bischof and Pelinka, eds., Austro-Corporatism: Past, Present, Future, 5-20. 
32The title of Kurt Waldheim's book notwithstanding-The Austrian Example (New York, 
1973). The German title is actually Der Osterreichische Weg. 
33Schmitter, "Corporatism," 197. 
34As Tony Judt has said in a well-informed essay, "It has been a long time since Austria 
mattered much for anyone who doesn't live there" (which is precisely what Austrian 
supporters of Anschluss in all ideological camps feared during the 1920s and 1930s). New 
York Review of Books, Feb. 15, 1996, 22. 
35Hans-Georg Betz, "The Transformation of the Austrian Party System 1986-1996," 
unpublished conference paper, German Studies Association, Seattle, October, 13, 1996. 
36Ibid., 12. 
37Diethelm Prowe, "'Classic' Fascism and the New Radical Right in Western Europe: 
Comparisons and Contrasts," Contemporary European History 3 (1994): 289-312. 
38Judson, Wien Brennt!, aptly characterizes this language as "a strange blend of shrill, 
defensive, nationalist rhetoric and the most radically progressive, optimistic assertions of the 
effectiveness of education and science for the good of mankind" (150; see also 151-55). 
39Barbara Haider, Die Protokolle des Verfassungsausschusses des Reichsrates vom Jahre 
1867 (Vienna, 1997). 
40Ibid., 11. 
41 The Times Literary Supplement, Jan. 16, 1998, 6. As this article went to press the following 
essay by Peter Pulzer, closely related in its concerns and some of its suggestions, came to my 
attention: "Between Collectivism and Liberalism: The Political Evolution of Austria since 
1945" in Kurt Richard Luther and Peter Pulzer, eds., Austria 1945-95: Fifty years of the 
second republic (Aldershot, 1998), 227-33 
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